Introduction
The public housing program has been run by Local Housing Authorities (LHA's) since the program began in 1937.1 When constructing new units LHA's float tax-free bonds, guaranteed and subsidized by the federal government. 2 Ongoing operating costs were, until 1969, generally satisfied by rental revenues without financial assistance from the federal government. 3 During 1969, Congress dramatically altered the system of federal obligations and subsidies for LHA's in two ways: it passed the Brooke Amendment limiting a tenant's rent in public housing to twenty-five percent of a tenant's income; 4 at the same time, Congress authorized federal funds for the ongoing operating deficits as well as the construction debts in LHA's. 5 The new system for financing public housing is now in shambles. The limitation on tenant rentals, combined with rising operating costs, has caused LHA's to run large operating deficits. 0 However, Congress has not appropriated enough funds specifically to meet these deficits, 7 and the executive branch has refused to satisfy the need from other eligible appropriations. 8 As a result, many LHA's face imminent bankruptcy. 9 The current fiscal crisis in public housing has important implications for an increasing number of public corporations 10 which, like LHA's, 11 exist as legal hybrids between government agencies and private companies. Similar public corporations may be chartered by the state, e.g., the New York Port Authority, 12 or by the federal government, e.g., the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).' 3 In contrast to government agencies, these public corporations are distinct legal entities without sovereign immunity.' 4 They maintain their own treas- (NAHRO) . Efforts to obtain HUD figures on aggregate deficits claimed by LHA's were unsuccessful, either because HUD does not compute such figures or does not release them to the public. The fiscal crisis for LHA's may also have implications for non.profit corporations, a topic beyond the scope of this article. However, non-profit corporations may be dis. tinguished from quasi-public corporations on legal and policy grounds. Most non.profit corporations are registered under a general state incorporation act or a general nonprofit incorporation act, as opposed to a special act of the legislature. H. Otcs. NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS AND AssocIATioNs 127-44 (1956). Non-profit corporations are typically run by boards elected by members or trustees rather than appointed by state or federal governments. Id. at 270-71.
Moreover, the policy reasons for non-profit corporations are mainly the promotion of pluralistic "giving" and neighborhood control, in contrast to the key policy goal of business-type management in quasi-public corporations. 
See generally 16 U.S.C. § 831-831d(d) (1970).
14. A LHA is "a public body corporate and politic," Wtsc. STAT. ANN. 66A0(4)(a) (1965) , which can sue and be sued in its own name. Wise. STAT. ANN. § 66A0(9)(n) (1965 uries and hold property in their own names."; Their board members are usually non-partisan appointees, outside the civil service regulations, with significant protection against removal. 1 0 In contrast to private companies, these public corporations are established by special legislative act and are operated by boards appointed by a governmental official. 7 Government appropriations provide initial capital to these corporations, though they also float bonds. 1 8 They usually make payments in lieu of taxes and send annual reports to the chartering governmental body.' 9 Because public corporations are legal hybrids, the legal status of their financial agreements with any government body is problematic. Private companies bargain at arm's-length over contracts which are binding on the government, 20 while government agencies have no "enforceable" agreements with each other or the chief executive. 2 ' But public corporations, such as LHA's, are in the middle-heavily dependent on government subsidies, but intended to operate as independent legal entities.
22
Government officials are currently attempting to treat certain public corporations as parts of government agencies whose subsidies can be reduced or eliminated as matters of executive discretion. 22. For example, the legal constraints on the Post Office, a newly created public corporation, are set by the rate levels approved by Congress. Since these rate levels are too low to generate a yearly profit, the Post Office must receive financial assistance of some kind from the government. See generally 39 U.S.C. § 101-5605 (1970).
23. See, e.g., argument by government on the cross-claim, Brief for HUD, Barber v. White, Civ. Action 15,235 (D. Conn., filed Jan. 26, 1973), maintaining that HUD has almost total discretion over operating subsidies to LHA's. treatment undercuts one of the key legislative purposes of these corporations-the promotion of business efficiency through decentralized decision-making.24 When the provision of adequate subsidies becomes uncertain, public corporations cannot rationally plan existing programs or embark on innovative ones. 25 Moreover, a high risk of nonpayment is likely to induce private suppliers to increase their charges for goods and services. The legislature could, of course, eliminate public housing or any program carried out by a public corporation. It could also transform public corporations into parts of a government agency. But so long as these programs are retained within their current legal framework, the task is to structure a system for providing operating subsidies that will allow public corporations to reap the benefits of decentralized decision-making while at the same time maintaining some accountability to the government. This article will examine the fiscal problems of LHA's as a case study in the financing of public corporations. The legislative and executive roots of the fiscal crisis now facing LHA's will be explored. The barriers to resolving this crisis through administrative laws will then be considered. Finally, a contract approach, supplemented by a funding formula, will be suggested for dealing with the financial problems of public corporations.
I. Federal Roots of the Fiscal Crisis
The advantages of decentralized decision-making for LHA's have been severely undercut by the uncertainties of government funding. Congress only gradually faced up to the fiscal implications of its substantive legislation on public housing. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) moved even more slowly in making full use of congressional authorization. When HUD finally began to push for adequate operating subsidies, it was blocked by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
A. Legislative Irresponsibility
To improve the plight of the low-income residents of public housing, Congress in 1969 limited tenant rentals to twenty-five percent of 24. The House committee report on the TVA, for example, stated: "We intend that the corporation shall have much of the essential freedom and elasticity of a private business corporation." H.R. REP. No. 130, 73d Cong.. 1st Sess. 19 (1933) . Similarly, a New York State Commission said that the quasi-public corporation form would "provide a more flexible administrative instrument to manage commercial type public enterprises," quoted in Abel, supra note 10, at 190. (1) to assure the low-rent character of the projects involved, and (2) to achieve and maintain adequate operating and maintenance services and reserve funds including payment of outstanding debts.
Although the attempt to reduce the rental burden of public housing tenants may have been laudable, the legislators failed to cope with the fiscal implications of their statutory reforms. First, the authorized funds for operating subsidies were originally insufficient to meet the extra cost imposed by the twenty-five percent limitation on tenant rentals. 31 In fiscal year 1972, for example, the authorized funds earmarked for operating subsidies totaled $185 million, as compared to the estimated loss in LHA revenues of $200 million caused by the three Brooke Amendments. 32 Only in the middle of fiscal year 1973 did Congress increase the statutory maximum for annual contributions earmarked for operating subsidies to a level above actual revenue lost under the three Brooke Amendments. Second, the funds authorized for operating expenses were geared only to the extra costs imposed by the Brooke Amendments. But LHA and HUD officials had warned Congress that local housing projects were rapidly becoming insolvent before the passage of the Brooke Amendments.
34 Two independent studies of LHA's showed that operating costs between 1965 and 1968 had risen by 6.9 percent per annum, mainly as a result of inflation.
3 5 Revenues of LHA's had not kept pace with these rises in operating costs despite large increases in rental charges. For example, from 1952 to 1967 rents of the New York City Housing Authority increased by 71.6 percent, but operating costs rose by 125.6 percent. Third, Congress deferred to the limited funding requests of HUD 3a rather than exercising its power to appropriate all the money authorized for operating subsidies.
38 Thus, despite an authorization of $185 million toward the operating expenses of public housing in fiscal year 1971, Congress appropriated only $108 million.
3°B
. Even after fiscal 1971, when HUD did seek appropriations to cover operating subsidies out of the additional authorizations, the requests were often below the sums that had been authorized.4 5 There is little doubt that the Committee would have deferred to higher requests on the basis of HUD's expertise. 4 0 In fiscal 1972 the Committee requested that HUD submit a supplemental estimate on operating subsidies because the sum asked for was so obviously inadequate. 4 7 HUD did not comply with the request.
To provide more operating subsidies without expending more money on public housing, HUD finally shifted funds from other aspects of public housing, like new construction, to operating subsidies. 48 But the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) opposed shifting funds 49 in sufficient amounts to-fill the gap between the earmarked appropriation for operating subsidies and the aggregate operating deficit of LHA's. 5 0 As a result, HUD was forced to reduce operating subsidies to levels substantially beneath the deficits incurred by individual LHA's during fiscal years 1972 and 1973 
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The Financing of Local Housing Authorities One key legal weapon employed by HUD to curtail operating subsidies was § 1410(b), which limited "fixed annual contributions" to the yearly yield at a specified interest rate on development cost.5 2 After the National Association of Housing & Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO) filed suit against applying the § 1410(b) limitation to operating subsidies, 53 Congress repealed the section by a joint resolution in 1973. 5. However, HUD with the help of OMB then promulgated new funding procedures,i 5 still pegged to annual contributions as computed under § 1410(b). "
II. Local Response Through Administrative Law
To offset their deficits, LHA's have used up reserves, ceased maintenance of units, and raised rentals of tenants. "T As the effectiveness of these stop-gap measures has been exhausted, they have attempted to obtain injunctions in the nature of mandamus ordering HUD to provide more operating subsidies for LHA's. s Tenants, meanwhile, have brought suits against LHA's for statutory violations. 50 The legal measures taken by LHA's as well as the countermeasures taken by tenants have proceeded on theories of administrative law. The net 56. See generally New Public Housing Operating Subsidy Formula, 2 Law Project Bulletin #2, at 6-11, Dec. 15, 1972 (mimeograph).
The new uniform funding procedures contravene the prime purpose behind the congressional joint resolution. The "uniform" funding scheme is pegged to project budgets for the last half of fiscal 1971 and the first part of fiscal 1972. HUD Circular H.M. 7475. 12, 3(a)(1)(a) , Nov. 28, 1972 . Since the § 1410(b) limitation was in effect during these two fiscal years, HUD has implicitly continued a statutory provision ovemled by Congress. The continued reliance on this statutory provision is justified by HUD on the entirely unsupported assertion that "Departmental assurance was given that the elimination of this restriction would be utilized only in cases where the Housing AuthorIty is faced with a severe financial emergency." Id. at 5(a). The unappealing but blunt fact is that nothing in the Act nor any judgment of this Court enforcing the Act requires the NHHA to continue in operation ... as long as the NHHA is operating with federal funds and pursuant to federal law, the provisions of federal law will be strictly enforced.
Judge Newman correctly reasoned that although the rents charged welfare recipients by the NHHA were set according to state law," 0 the Supremacy Clause requires state law to be subordinated to federal requirements." It the federal requirements are too onerous, then NHHA can simply go out of business. tively bar public housing by failing to pass enabling legislation, and city governments may refuse to take advantage of state enabling legislation. 8 While the liquidation of a housing project would normally require that the bondholders be compensated, the federal government has always guaranteed by statute the annual payment of these LHA bonds regardless of the project's fiscal status. 69 
B. LHA's v. HUD
Recently, NAHRO requested an injunction in the nature of mandamus compelling HUD to make up all the operating deficits of LHA's3 0 The crux of NAHRO's argument is that HUD has a ministerial, i.e., non-discretionary, duty to draw upon the unspent authorizations of past fiscal years. 7 ' According to the recent holding of a U.S. district court 7 2 however, the statutory framework "does not command
1973) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum Opinion Order and Judgment). The court in
Fletcher found that the financial problems of the LHA justified the exclusion of prospective tenants from vacant units solely because their incomes were too low.
If Fletcher is interpreted broadly to permit the exclusion of all very poor tenants from public housing, it may be criticized for flaunting legislative history, statutory language, and judicial precedent. The legislative history shows that public housing was intended to "take care of the poorest first," 81 Co.NG. Rac. 8098 (1937), and "to give preference to families with the most urgent housing needs." S. REP. No. 84. 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1949) . The statute now requires that preference for admission to public housing be given by criteria not necessarily related to income. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g)(2) (1970). Moreover, this discrimination against the very poor runs counter to judicial precedent in Thomas v. Housing Authority, 288 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967) . In that case, the court held that the exclusion of all unwed mothers from public housing violated the Equal Protection Clause because this category is not rationally related to the main purpose of providing safe and sanitary housing for low-income families. Id. at 579.
If Fletcher is interpreted more narrowly-in light of legislative history, statutory language, and judicial precedent as discussed above-it should mean that LHA's can promulgate admission policies geared to achieving a more even income distribution of tenants, but only within very strict boundaries. Such admission policies must be limited to tenants within the income range statutorily defined for public housing, they cannot categorically exclude tenants on criteria such as race or welfare recipiency, and they cannot violate the legislative preferences for admission which are often unrelated to income. Under this narrow interpretation of Fletcher, LHA's would not be able to use admission policies to increase rental revenues by a sufficient amount to offset operating costs. For example, the "rent range" admission policy used by the LHA in Fletcher increased rental revenues by only R25,000 for a year in which the authority asked for over one million dollars in operating subsidies. ,Memorandum Opinion Order and Judgment, supra, at 6. The Yale Law Journal HUD to spend or commit all of the contract authority available for a given year." 73 Moreover, the idea of drawing upon authorizations from past fiscal years violates the annual basis for public housing finance.
See

74
Even if NAHRO could persuade a court that the general authorization for public housing was in effect a specific appropriation for operating subsidies, NAHRO would still face two major legal barriers to success. First, there would be the issue of whether an agency must spend the full amount of its appropriations.T And second, NAHRO would have to persuade a judge that the suit was not a disguised attempt to claim money damages from the government. 0
III. A Contract Approach to Financing Public Housing
Stymied in seeking to pass increasing costs to tenants or to extract funds from HUD, the LHA's might profitably launch litigation based on a contract theory of HUD-LHA agreements. Agreements with the government for a current or past fiscal year should be treated as binding contract obligations. And to set the level of future subsidies, a funding formula should be established either by Congress or by HUD and NAHRO through collective bargaining.
A. Contracts Between LHA's and HUD
LHA's are more like private firms contracting with the federal government than administrative agencies within the federal bureaucracy. Congress originally designed LHA's as independent corporations chartered by states and financed by private bondholders. 77 76. At least one federal district court has dismissed such a mandamus suit to compel the release of HUD funds on the grounds that it challenged sovereign immunity and should be properly decided by the Court of Claims. Housing Authority v. HUD, 340 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972) .
77. The original decision to establish LHA's was prompted by local resentment against the federal Public Works Administration and by a Sixth Circuit decision that slum clearance and construction of low.rent housing were not a legitimate public purpose for the federal exercise of eminent domain. The independent authority form, typified by an unpaid board of commis. sioners appointed by the mayor, was chosen to insulate the program from "politics" and municipal corruption and to avoid municipal debt limitations. The federal Public Housing Administration (PHA) acts only at the summons of local officials. Note, supra note 68, at 509.
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The Financing of Local Housing Authorities stressed their "local autonomy" in a 1959 amendment." 8 A federal district court recently recognized that the LHA-HUD relationship was contractual rather than administrative by viewing each LHA as "an independent entity which contracts (as a principal) with both the State and Federal Governments."" 0 Under the express contracts (ACC's) signed with HUD, 8 0 that Department agrees to provide certain kinds of financial assistance to LHA's if they agree to follow elaborate sets of operational guidelines.,, Since HUD began paying operating as well as construction subsidies in 1969, the Department has worked through circulars 8 2 which have been accorded the legally binding effect of explicit clauses in the ACC's. 3 These circulars set forth specific guidelines for LHA's in preparing annual budgets and calculating operating subsidies necessary for the coming fiscal year. Within HUD, area and regional officials approved these budgets, and their signatures should be regarded as incurring binding obligations to pay operating subsidies included in the budgets. 8 84. For example, at the end of the current circular, Subsidies for Operations. supra note 82, there is a space for the signatures of the review officer of the area office and the accountant of the regional office. These signatures go below a sum which is marked "Amount of Subsidies for Operations prevalidated and approved for payment." These signatures may be regarded as constituting a binding commitment to the designated sum for operating subsidies. InterviEw with Mr. John Shaw, Chief of the Financial Management Branch, Program Services Division, HUD Office of Housing Management (Mar. ,0, 1973). The two latest circulars, Subsidies for Operations and Forward-Funding, supra note 82, were intended to provide LHA's with definite assurances of the designated level of operating subsidy before the start of the fiscal year, id., in contrast to the prior s)stern of discretionary reimbursement of operating deficits at the end of the fiscal year as The Yale Law Journal Moreover, HUD proposed an amendment to the ACC's in 1972 requiring LHA's to submit estimates of the "additional annual contributions" needed to make up operating deficits. 85 If these estimates are approved by HUD area and regional officials, such approval should similarly be regarded as creating binding contracts. HUD was empowered by Congress to make such contract amendments for operating subsidies. 8 0 The contracts say: "The faith of the United States is solemnly pledged to the payment of all annual contributions contracted for . . ." and such contract obligations shall be paid "out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated." 
B. Breach of Contract
If operating subsidies designated in approved budgets have not been paid in full, LHA's should be able to obtain contract damages against HUD in the Court of Claims. 88 Several defenses are available to HUD: the government's sovereign immunity, the absence of authority of HUD agents, or the lack of consideration for the operating subsidies. But LHA's may exploit well-recognized exceptions to these defenses.
Sovereign Immunity
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the government may be sued in contract only if it has consented to be sued." But in the Tucker Act, the United States consented to be sued for claims "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulations of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States ... ."00 Thus, LHA's can sue on the ACC's as an express contract with the United States, or on a 
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The Financing of Local Housing Authorities claim founded upon § 1410(e) guaranteeing the "payment of all annual contributions contracted for pursuant to this section." 0 1 The most serious problem posed by sovereign immunity for the success of contract claims by LHA's against HUD is the notion of a protected sovereign act, as announced in the Horowitz case:
It has long been held by the Court of Claims that the United States when sued as a contractor cannot be held liable for an obstruction to the performance of the particular contract resulting from its public and general acts as a sovereign.
The Horowitz rule has been severely criticized. 3 But regardless of the rule, LHA's could fit within at least two well-established exceptions. First, since the alleged sovereign act was carried out by HUD, the same agency which made the contract, then HUD cannot hide behind its own act under the sovereignty doctrine. 0 4 Second, the failure of Congress to appropriate enough money for LHA operating subsidies is not a protected sovereign act if the contract was made according to proper contract procedures. 3
Actual and Apparent Authority
HUD could also argue against contract claims on grounds that HUD area and regional agents had no actual authority to bind the Department as principal to the ACC's. To be sure, HUD agents, despite Retroactivity: Paramount Powers and Contractual Changes, 71 YALE LJ. 1191 (1962 . 94. See, e.g., Beuttas v. United States, 11 Ct. Cl. 532 (1943 , where the Court of Claims distinguished the Horowitz line of cases, saying.
[I]n all of those cases the contracting officer had nothing whatsoever to do with the act complained of, while in the present case it was the very department of the Government that entered into the contracts with plaintiffs .... Id. at 537. For example, in Seatrain v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 272 (1943) , a private firm agreed to construct two vessels of a certain type in exchange for a contract from the Postmaster General to carry the mail. But Congress passed a proviso to the appropriations of the Post Office Department which said no part of the appropriations should be paid on the contract with this firm. Nevertheless, the court held for the private contractor, sayingWhen Congress delegates to an agency of the Government the right to enter into a contract under certain terms and conditions, and these terms and conditions are fully carried out and a contract is entered into, it becomes a valid, binding agreement of the Government and such valid contract is protected by the Fifth Amendment and cannot be taken away without making just compensation. Id. at 315.
The Yale Law Journal their authority to make binding financial commitments to individual LHA's, had no authority to promise operating subsidies, which in the aggregate exceeded the total annual appropriations eligible for operating subsidies." 6 But, while HUD agents may have lacked actual authority, they clearly manifested apparent authority by signing ACC's and approving LHA budgets.9"
If HUD were a private party, it would be estopped from arguing that the sums involved in contracts exceeded appropriated funds, and the LHA's would recover approved operating deficits to the extent that they were actually incurred. Apparent authority is not generally applicable against the government. 98 But the Supreme Court has specifically held in favor of contractors in cases where authorized govern. ment agents have contracted for aggregate sums exceeding the relevant congressional appropriation, because:
persons contracting with the Government for partial service under general appropriations are not bound to know the condition of the appropriation account at the Treasury as on the contract book of the Department."
Failure of Consideration
Finally, HUD could argue that LHA's gave no consideration for HUD's commitment to operating subsidies. 00 But this defense should be invalidated because the consideration in the ACC's is a mutual promise to perform certain acts for the direct benefit of the government-acts which impose serious financial constraints on local housing authorities.' 0 ' Doubts as to the existence of adequate consideration 96. In reply to NAHRO's claims that certain LHA's are due more money for operating subsidies, HUD has maintained in part that it has already allocated all eligible funds for public housing. Affidavit of Nathaniel J. Eiseman, Director of HUD Office of Budget, NAHRO v. Romney, Civ. Act. No. 2080 -72 (D.D.C., filed Mar. 6, 1973 101. In the ACC's, the LHA's agree to follow certain housing policies set by HUD. The ACC says: "The Local Authority shall at all times maintain the low-rent character of each of the Projects." ACC § 202. It also says: "The Local Authority shall at all times maintain each Project in good repair, order, and condition." ACC § 209. Some provisions of the ACC's are more related to general governmental goals than HUD's housing policy. LHA's must buy supplies only from American firms. ACC § 303. LHA's "shall take affirmative action" to promote racial, religious, and sexual equality in employment. ACC § 301. The Local Authorities must "pay to the Government a reasonable fixed fee for providing representatives of the Government at the site of each Project in connection with the construction thereof." ACC § 122.
should be resolved against HUD since the ACC's are standard contracts drafted by the Department.
102
Even if a court should decide that LHA's have provided no consideration, LHA's could still obtain damages by promissory estoppel, under which courts have granted reliance damages on conditional promises of a gift or grant. 10 3 When HUD approves budgets of LHA's, it should reasonably foresee that LHA's will rely on them in incurring obligations to private businessmen, leases with tenants, and commitments of rent subsidies to private landlords under the leased units program. 104
C. Renegotiation of Contracts
A contract approach to HUD-LHA agreements, though it might win damages for breach of contracts for past years, does not provide an adequate solution for future LHA financial problems. Were courts to adopt a contract theory, HUD might well refuse approval of annual LHA budgets until Congress granted the Department's appropriations. In its appropriations requests, HUD could simply seek an amount substantially less than the aggregate sum needed to cover operating subsidies. If tradition holds, the Congressional Appropriations Committees, despite their receptivity to funding requests for operating subsidies, would defer to HUD's expertise.2 0 5 With this low appropriation, HUD would then compel LHA's to reduce their operating subsidy requests before the Department would sign their budgets. 10 0 The LHA-HUD agreements would thus be contractually binding, but effectively inadequate.
A long-term solution requires a restructuring of HUD-LHA relationships to provide for a funding formula as the basis for yearly LHA allocations. The formula, incorporated in all ACC's, would not only be legally binding against HUD, but also would guide the Appropriations Committee in evaluating the sufficiency of HUD funding requests. It would facilitate more rational planning on the part of both LHA's and HUD, by enabling longer-range projection of spend-102. Standard government contracts should be interpreted against the drafter. 1 J. Me. The Yale Law Journal ing and revenue needs. In a larger sense, it would promote more precise assessments of the quality of public housing to be made available, the costs and the benefits.
The funding formula would be based on a realistic appraisal of the factors influencing the income and revenue of LHA's. These factors would include the rent levels under the Brooke Amendments, the impact of inflation on operating expenses, the cost of qualifying projects under the housing code, and the need for LHA's to maintain operating reserves. Such a formula would differ significantly from the current funding circular 0 7 and contract amendment proposed by HUD,' 0 8 which are based on a project maximum repealed by Congress' 0 9 as well as an arbitrary cost estimate imposed on HUD by OMB. 10 Courts should provide the impetus for a realistic funding formula by invalidating the current HUD circular on operating subsidies, as requested by LHA's in two pending cases."" Two methods would be available to establish a new formula for operating subsidies. LHA's could arrive at a formula through collective bargaining with HUD. Alternatively, Congress could impose a legislative formula on all parties. Under either approach, the formula would be legally binding. While LHA's would continue to submit yearly requests for operating subsidies to area and regional offices of 107. See Subsidies for Operations, supra note 55.
108. See note 85 supra. 109. See note 56 supra. 110. The current HUD circular for computing operating subsidies is arbitrary for two reasons. First, by basing all calculations on fiscal year 1971, the circular locks LHA's into the level of operating expenses which they fortuitously incurred during that particu. lar fiscal year. Second, the current HUD circular says that operating costs should be increased by three percent per year from the baseline of fiscal 1971. Subsidies for Operations, supra note 55, at 3a(l). But independent surveys showed that in tile latter half of the 1960's operating costs rose annually by almost seven percent, mainly due to inflation. See p. 1213 supra. HUD itself estimates an average rise in operating costs of over four percent per year between 1970 and 1973. Interview with Mr. Robert Gair, HUD Office of Budget (March 20, 1973) . There is ample judicial support for invalidating such circulars. Administrative circulars by HUD have recently been struck down because they flaunted legislative intent on other housing programs, Davis v. Romney, 41 U.S.L.W. 2446 (E.D. Pa., Feb. 13, 1973 . As to the arbitrary cost figures, the judge said in denying a preliminary injunction to NAHRO on its mandamus claim:
The statute gives HUD considerable discretion in allocating subsidy [sic] to the local housing authorities. HUD, of course, cannot exercise this discretion In an arbitrary or unreasonable way . . . . In an appropriate case, a District Court might order HUD to re-examine the amount of subsidy allocated to a local housing authority. Order and Memorandum Opinion, supra note 72, at 4.
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The Yale Law Journal by presenting a united front through NAHRO, as indicated by the success of other similar groups in collective bargaining with HUD. 12 1 If, on the other hand, Congress chose to establish a formula for LHA's and HUD, congressional calculations could be based on hearings and investigations conducted by the Banking and Currency Committees. Congress could then pass a legislative formula for operating subsidies similar to the one for revenue sharing, delineating the factors to be considered and their relative weighting. The formula could be reviewed each year by Congress, and modifications could be made to take into account changes in the public housing program.
Conclusion
Contract theories might be applied to the financing of other public corporations similar to LHA's. For them, as for LHA's, theories of administrative law reinforce the statutory rights of program beneficiaries without requiring adequate government subsidies to finance these statutory rights. Under a funding formula approach, the proper level of government subsidies could be determined by Congress or through negotiations between the corporation and the relevant government agency. Once Congress passed the appropriations mandated by the funding formula, public corporations would have claims based on contract or statute against the government for these operating subsidies. Such an approach would provide public corporations with the financial security needed to benefit from decentralized management, while guaranteeing the government an opportunity to review their activities.
121. Tenant unions won significant improvements in standard lease forms through collective bargaining. See Lefcoe, supra note 83, at 463.
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